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Abstract
The point of departure of this paper is a puzzling reference to Saussure in Chomsky’s book Knowledge 
of language (Chomsky 1986). Taken at face value, this reference appears to reverse dramatically 
Chomsky’s earlier negative evaluation of a central aspect of Saussurean thought. However, I argue 
that, properly interpreted, the quotation does not in fact  embody  a  changed  assessment  of  Saussure 
on  Chomsky’s  part. Along the path to my conclusion, questions will inevitably arise regarding 
the compatibility of Saussure’s views of language with those of Chomsky’s. I deal with such 
questions in a somewhat scattershot manner, because the relationship (historical and intellectual) 
between Saussure’s ideas and those of Chomsky’s is too difficult and too open-ended for a short 
communication such as this one. For Chomsky, at least, we have an unbroken paper trail stretching 
over sixty years, documenting his positions and their historical evolution. But ascertaining what 
Saussure’s position was on a variety of central questions is a perhaps insurmountable challenge, 
given that he published very little and his personal notes (which continue to be discovered) are often 
too fragmentary to allow unambiguous interpretation.
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Resumen
El punto de partida de este trabajo es una referencia desconcertante a Saussure en el libro de 
Chomsky intitulado Conocimiento del lenguaje (Chomsky 1986). Tomada a primera vista, esta 
referencia parece invertir dramáticamente la anterior evaluación negativa de Chomsky de un aspecto 
central del pensamiento saussureano. Sin embargo, sostengo que, correctamente interpretada, la cita 
no encarna de hecho una evaluación cambiada de Saussure por parte de Chomsky. A lo largo del 
camino que lleva a mi conclusión, inevitablemente surgirán preguntas acerca de la compatibilidad 
de las concepciones de Saussure con las de Chomsky. Me ocupo de tales cuestiones de una manera 
un tanto dispersa, porque la relación (histórica e intelectual) entre las ideas de Saussure y las de 
Chomsky es demasiado difícil y demasiado abierta para una comunicación corta como ésta. Para 
Chomsky, por lo menos, tenemos una trayectoria  ininterrumpida de artículos de por lo menos 
sesenta años, que documenta sus posiciones y su evolución histórica. Pero determinar cuál era la 
posición de Saussure sobre una variedad de cuestiones centrales es quizá un reto insuperable, ya que 
publicó muy poco y sus notas personales (que siguen siendo descubiertas) son a menudo demasiado 
fragmentarias para permitir una interpretación inequívoca.
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1. Introduction
The point of departure of this paper is a 
puzzling reference to Saus- sure in Chomsky’s 
book Knowledge of language (Chomsky 1986). 
Taken at face value, this reference appears to 
reverse dramatically Chomsky’s earlier negative 
evaluation of a central aspect of Saussurean 
thought. However, I argue that, properly 
interpreted, the quotation does not in fact 
embody  a  changed  assessment  of  Saussure 
on  Chomsky’s  part. Along the path to my 
conclusion, questions will inevitably arise regar- 
ding the compatibility of Saussure’s views 
of language with those of Chomsky’s. I deal 
with such questions in a somewhat scattershot 
manner, because the relationship (historical 
and intellectual) between Saussure’s ideas and 
those of Chomsky’s is too difficult and too 
open-ended for a short communication such 
as this one. For Chomsky, at least, we have an 
unbroken paper trail stretching over sixty years, 
documenting his positions and their historical 
evolution. But ascertaining what Saussure’s 
posi- tion was on a variety of central questions 
is a perhaps insurmountable challenge, given 
that he published very little and his personal 
notes (which continue to be discovered) are 
often too fragmentary to allow unambiguous 
interpretation.  Most  problematically,  Saussure 
did  not  himself write the seminal book that bears 
his name on the title page (Saussure 1916/2005). 
In fact, the two colleagues of Saussure’s who 
compiled the book did not attend the lectures 
on which it was based and examination of the 
notes by the students who did attend the classes 
has revealed a number of discrepancies with the 
published volume. All of this is well-known, of 
course, but it is worth stressing at the outset as a 
sort of advance apology for what might appear 
to the reader to be an excessive reserve on my 
part to reach definitive conclusions on Saussure’s 
‘true’ opinions, and hence their compatibility 
with Chomsky’s2.
The passage in Chomsky (1986) with which I 
am most directly concerned is the following:
It should be noted that familiar 
characterizations of ‘language’ as a code or a 
game point correctly toward I-language, not 
the artificial construct E-language. A code 
is not a set of representations but rather a 
specific system of rules that assigns coded 
representations to message-representations. 
Two codes may be different, although 
externally identical in the message-code 
pairings that they provide. Similarly, a game 
is not a set of moves but rather the rule system 
that underlies them. The Saussurean concept of 
langue, although far too narrow in conception, 
might be interpreted as appropriate in this 
respect. (Chomsky 1986: 31)
Chomsky appears in this passage to be 
identifying Saussure’s langue as a rule system 
that characterizes a speaker’s I-language, 
where I – (for ‘internalized’) language is ‘some 
element of the mind of the person who knows 
the language, acquired by the learner, and used 
by the speaker-hearer’ (Chomsky 1986: 22). E – 
(for ‘externalized’) language, on the other hand, 
is language ‘understood independently of the 
properties of the mind/brain’ (p. 20)3.
The problem to be addressed here is that not 
many pages earlier in Knowledge of language, 
Chomsky had unambiguously (it seems to me) 
assigned langue to E-language! The first paragraph 
of §2.2 of the book, entitled ‘Externalized 
language’, mentions that the term ‘grammar’ 
has been used in a variety of ways, after which 
Chomsky moves directly to approaches that 
(mistakenly, in his view) focus on E-language. 
One of them is ‘Saussurean structuralism’:
Structural and descriptive linguistics, 
behavioral psychology, and other contemporary 
approaches tended to view a language as 
a collection of actions, or utterances, or 
2 For a recent state-of-the-art documentation of the evolution of Saussure’s ideas, see Joseph (2012).
3 I-language and ‘(grammatical) competence’ are roughly equivalent notions. However, E-language should not 
be confused with ‘performance’ or with Saussurean parole. E-language is a way of conceptualizing grammar, 
while performance and parole pertain to the actual use of language. 
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linguistic forms (words, sentences) paired 
with meanings, or as a system of linguistic 
forms or events. In Saussurean structuralism, 
a language (langue) was taken to be a system of 
sounds and an associated system of concepts; 
the notion of sentence was left in a kind of 
limbo, perhaps to be accommodated within 
the study of language use. (Chomsky 1986: 19)
The sentences that follow refer to the linguists 
Leonard Bloomfield and Zellig Harris and to the 
philosophers David Lewis and Willard Quine, all 
of whom, according to Chomsky, conceived of 
grammars as species of E-language. And on the 
page immediately after his remarks about langue 
being appropriately thought of as a system of 
rules, Chomsky remarked that ‘Saussurean 
structuralism had placed Jespersen’s observation 
about “free expressions” outside of the scope of 
the study of language structure, of Saussure’s 
langue’ (Chomsky 1986: 32). Since Jespersen, 
along with Humboldt, were the only historical 
figures cited in the chapter whose conception of 
language Chomsky deemed compatible with his 
notion of I-language, it seems clear to me that 
Chomsky was implicitly characterizing Saussure 
as being (merely) interested in E-language.
In other words, it would appear, superficially 
at least, that Chomsky sandwiched a positive 
appraisal of Saussure in between two negative 
appraisals (with respect to the same issue) in 
the same chapter of the same book. The positive 
appraisal —if that is what it was— stands out 
as an extraordinary one from Chomsky’s point 
of view. To the best of my knowledge Chomsky 
had never before referred to Saussure’s langue as 
a system of generative rules. The following quote 
from Aspects of the theory of syntax 21 years earlier 
states his longstanding position quite clearly4:
The distinction I am noting here is related 
to the langue-parole distinction of Saussure; but 
it is necessary to reject his concept of langue as 
merely a systematic inventory of items and to 
return rather to the Humboldtian conception 
of underlying competence as a system of 
generative processes. (Chomsky 1965: 4)
In the above passage, langue is characterized 
as an ‘inventory’, not as a rule system.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2 I trace 
Chomsky’s remarks on Saussure from their first 
mention in 1963 to the 1986 book that forms the 
nexus for this discussion. Section 3 raises (and 
then dismisses) the possibility that the account 
of Saussure in Anderson (1985) might have 
led Chomsky to more positively evaluate the 
former’s theoretical framework. In section 4 I 
make the case that Chomsky was only rhetorically 
attributing to Saussure the idea that langue was 
conceptualizable as an I-language based system 
of rules, a position that I reinforce in §5 by making 
reference to analogous rhetorical strategies in 
Chomsky’s earlier work. Section 6 traces the 
more ‘Saussurean’ direction of Chomsky’s 
recent work and §7 is a brief conclusion.
2. Chomsky’s evaluation of Saussure through 
the decades
If we look at the published record, Chomsky 
has been remarkably consistent with respect 
to his evaluation of Saussure, though he has 
highlighted or downplayed certain aspects of 
the latter’s thought over the years. Chomsky’s 
first published references to Saussure from the 
early 1960s could be described as ‘positive, but 
with negative undertones’5:
In a work that inaugurated the modern 
era of language study Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1916/1966) drew a fundamental distinction 
between what he called langue and parole… It is 
the child’s innate faculté de langage that enables 
him to register and develop a linguistic system 
(langue) on the basis of scattered observations 
4 Some commentators, however, reject the idea that Saussure conceived of langue as merely a systematic 
inventory. For Robert Godel, for example, the difference between langue and competence ‘est surtout 
terminologique’ (Godel 1970: 35). For a brief discussion of Saussure’s view of syntax, see footnote 6 below.
5 See also Chomsky (1964a; 1964b; 1964c), which differ from each other in certain aspects, but are practically 
identical with respect to their opinions of Saussure. Space limitations prevent me from supplying all of 
Chomsky’s published references to Saussure. 
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of actual linguistic behavior (parole). Other 
aspects of the study of language can be seriously 
undertaken only on the basis of an adequate 
account of the speaker’s linguistic intuition, that 
is, on the basis of a description of his langue. 
This is the general point of view underlying 
the work with which we are here concerned… 
Our discussion departs from a strict Saussurian 
conception in two ways. First, we say nothing 
about the semantic side of langue… Second, our 
conception of langue differs from Saussure’s in 
one fundamental respect; namely langue must 
be represented as a generative process based on 
recursive rules. It seems that Saussure regarded 
langue as essentially a storehouse of signs… 
(Chomsky 1963: 327-328)
In other words, Saussure was on the right track, 
but his taxonomic preoccupations prevented 
him from appreciating the rule-governed 
creativity central to language. Nevertheless, this 
passage was positive enough that the editor of 
the critical edition of the Cours could describe it 
as ‘une veritable profession de foi saussurienne’ 
(De Mauro 1972: 400)6.
Chomsky’s  Aspects,  published  in  1965,  was 
his  first book-length study  entirely  devoted 
to  syntax  since  Syntactic  structures  (Chomsky 
1957).  Despite   his   noting   that   there   are 
parallels   between   the competence-performance 
distinction and that between langue and parole 
(Chomsky 1965: 4), Chomsky primarily focuses 
on the syntactic deficiencies of Saussure’s 
approach to language:
It is worth noting that this naïve view of 
language structure persists to modern times in 
various forms, for example, in Saussure’s image 
of a sequence of expressions corresponding to 
an amorphous sequence of concepts… (7-8)
Chomsky continued in this vein throughout 
the 1960s:
There are, then, many varieties of taxonomic 
syntax; in particular, the few remarks that de 
Saussure offers concerning syntax indicate that 
he accepts this position… (Chomsky 1966: 22)
The great Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure, who at the turn of the century laid the 
groundwork for modern structuralist linguistics, 
put forth the view that the only proper methods 
for linguistic analysis are segmentation and 
classification... In fact, Saussure in some respects 
even went beyond this in departing from 
the tradition of philosophical grammar. He 
occasionally expressed the view that processes 
of sentence formation do not belong to the 
system of language at all… (Chomsky 1968: 17)
Harris, and other methodologists of the 1940s, 
were developing an approach to linguistic 
analysis [including syntax — FJN] that one can 
trace at least to Saussure. (Chomsky 1969: 94, 
reprinted in Chomsky 1972: 194)
In other words, the more that syntax came 
to be central to Chomsky’s view of linguistic 
theory, the more critical he became of Saussure, 
whose remarks on this topic are, at best, 
ambiguous7. Nevertheless, at the time (and 
6 De Mauro, however, lists a number of ways in which he believes that Chomsky’s ideas differ from Saussure’s: 
Saussure is more interested than Chomsky in research methodology, in the ethnographic side of languages, 
in semiological links between language and other systems, in semantics, in working out a theory of parole 
/ performance, and in explaining the relation between the biological unity of the human species and the 
historical diversity of languages. 
7 It is not easy to determine where syntax fit in for Saussure. One could not ask for a more explicit attribution 
of syntax to parole than the following: ‘La phrase est le type par excellence du syntagme. Mais elle appartient à 
la parole, non à la langue …’ (Saussure 1916/2005: 172). But Saussure hedges a bit in the following paragraph. 
For example, ‘les locutions toutes faites’ like à quoi bon and prendre la mouche belong to langue, presumably 
because, being memorized as wholes, they mimic fixed elements of morphology and lexicon. But then, more 
problematically, Saussure writes that ‘il faut attribuer à la langue, non à la parole, tous les types de syntagmes 
construits sur des forms regulières’ (p. 173). Under one interpretation of that position, all rule-governed syntax 
could be encompassed under langue. He concludes the section with an agnostic: ‘Mais il faut reconnaître que 
dans le domaine du syntagme il n’y a pas de limite tranchée entre le fait de langue, marque de l’usage collectif, 
et le fait de parole, qui depend de la liberté individuelle’ (p. 173). 
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until about a decade later) Chomsky’s remarks 
vis-à-vis Saussure were  interpreted  positively 
enough  that  a  historiographer  of  linguistics 
could assert —quite implausibly, in my opinion- 
that Chomsky’s Aspects model was ‘triggered 
by the appearance of the English translation of 
[Saussure’s] Cours in 1959 and therefore owes 
much to Saussure’s work’ (Koerner 1973: 12).
John Joseph (2002) has carried out a close 
reading of Chomsky’s references to Saussure 
from the 1960s through the 1980s, dividing them 
into several time periods, each characterizable 
by Chomsky’s overall ‘attitude’ to Saussure (see 
also Koerner 2002 for similar remarks):
(1)  a.  Chomsky (1963) the Saussurean
b.  Chomsky (1962-64): Reaching further back
c.  Chomsky (1965-79) the Anti-Saussurean
d. Chomsky (1986) and after: the Neo-
Saussurean?
Joseph   attributes   Chomsky’s   changing 
evaluation   of   Saussure   to Chomsky’s desire to 
situate his view of language in the most propitious 
historical context. According to Joseph, in 1963 
Chomsky strove ‘to align himself with a pre-
Bloomfieldian precursor’ (Joseph 2002: 148). In 
the second period (1962-64) he began to identify 
his views with that of a more explicitly rationalist 
forebear, namely Humboldt, while at the same 
time drawing away from Saussure, whose ideas 
were ‘widely considered to be the cornerstone 
of structuralism, from which Chomsky now 
wished to distance his own position as much 
as possible’ (p. 150). This position intensified in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, as ‘Chomsky’s agenda 
had become just the opposite of what it had 
been in his 1963 article: to lump Saussure and 
the neo-Bloomfieldians together in one great 
“modern linguistics” demonology, framed by 
the Descartes-to Humboldt tradition and its 
generative revival’ (p. 151). Joseph drew the 
conclusion of Chomsky’s ‘neo-Saussureanism’ 
of 1986 from his face-value interpretation of the 
long quotation from Knowledge of language cited 
above and from Chomsky’s rather gentle critique 
of Saussurean syntactic theorizing, in which ‘the 
notion of sentence was left in a kind of limbo’. 
I present Joseph’s explanation of Chomsky’s 
apparent change of heart below in §6, in the 
context of a fuller discussion of Chomsky’s 
remarks about Saussure in his 1986 book.
In any event, I feel that Joseph provides 
reasonable partial explana- tions for Chomsky’s 
changing —and increasingly critical— remarks 
about Saussure over the twenty year period prior 
to 1986. But there is a simpler generalization 
available to explain Chomsky’s growing 
rhetorical stridency in that period: the more 
Chomsky was focused on syntax, the more 
critical he was of Saussure, who could not or 
would not incorporate syntactic theorizing into 
his theory of langue. The earlier (pre-Aspects) 
publications were extremely general in their 
overall content, so general that Saussure was 
a worthy precursor. Starting with Chomsky’s 
nearly exclusive focusing on syntax in the mid-
1960s, it was hardly surprising that Saussure 
would be transformed from revered antecedent 
to whipping boy. Consider the context of what 
has probably been Chomsky’s most negative 
one-sentence evaluation of Saussure, namely 
that ‘The impoverished and thoroughly 
inadequate conception of language expressed 
by Whitney and Saussure and numerous others 
proved to be entirely appropriate to the current 
stage of linguistic research’ (Chomsky 1968: 
18). Context makes it clear that ‘the current 
stage’ was one in which syntactic analysis was 
not on the agenda because ‘There was no clear 
understanding a century ago as to how one 
might proceed to construct generative grammars 
that “make infinite use of finite means…”’ 
(Chomsky 1968: 18)8.  Saussure’s conception was 
8 One should not draw the conclusion that Saussure opposed formalism in principle. For example, in his notes 
we find the comment that ‘Il n’y a pas, il ne peut y avoir d’expressions simples pour les notions linguistiques. 
L’expression simple sera algébrique ou elle ne sera pas’ (Godel 1957: 49). According to Robert Godel, Saussure’s 
‘dearest concern was to cast the theory of language into the rigid mold of a mathematical treatise’ (Godel 1966. 
481). 
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hence impoverished and thoroughly inadequate 
because it lacked a syntactic component. I am 
sure that it is true that even the most intellectually 
creative individuals are pleased to point to the 
giants of the past who in some way ‘anticipated’ 
their ideas. But the bottom line is that, as far as 
syntax is concerned, Saussure anticipated very 
little in the way of generative theorizing.
3. Did Chomsky (1986) draw from Anderson 
(1985)?
I repeat the central Chomsky quote here:
It should be noted that familiar 
characterizations of ‘language’ as a code or a 
game point correctly toward I-language, not 
the artificial construct E-language. A code 
is not a set of representations but rather a 
specific system of rules that assigns coded 
representations to message-representations. 
Two codes may be different, although 
externally identical in the message-code 
pairings that they provide. Similarly, a game 
is not a set of moves but rather the rule system 
that underlies them. The Saussurean concept of 
langue, although far too narrow in conception, 
might be interpreted as appropriate in this 
respect. (Chomsky 1986: 31)
Let us take this quote at face value, as Joseph 
did, and conclude that by 1986 Chomsky was 
interpreting Saussure’s conception of langue as 
an I-language-based rule system. The obvious 
question to ask is why Chomsky would have 
reevaluated his position. Given that no new 
relevant source material emanating from 
Saussure appeared in the decade prior to 1986, 
I can think of only one possible explanation. 
The year prior to the publication of Chomsky’s 
Knowledge of language saw the appearance of 
Stephen R. Anderson’s book Phonology in the 
twentieth century (Anderson 1985). Anderson 
presents an unorthodox and, to my knowledge, 
unique view of Saussure’s phonological 
theorizing, in which, for Saussure:
…a grammar provides a system of rules, 
or principles particular to a particular 
language, which characterize some of these 
representations as (potentially) belonging to 
different signs, and others as (potentially) 
belonging to the same sign in Saussurean 
terms. … the rules of language… are particular 
to that language, and, taken together, they 
characterize the system by which sound 
differences correspond to oppositions 
between signs. Saussure’s point, formulated 
in these terms, is clear: it is the business of the 
linguist to study not the nature of (phonetic) 
representations but the system of rules which 
underlies the differentiation of signs and thus 
constitutes a particular language. (Anderson 
1985: 34-35; emphasis in original)
Anderson goes on to write:
We must emphasize that, while Saussure had 
no sympathy for a description of alternations 
which posited unitary underlying forms and 
rules altering the character of segments, he 
certainly considered alternations to be a rule-
governed aspect of sound structure. Rather, 
he took the rules involved to be ones which 
directly related one surface form (in a given 
language) to another, without assigning 
priority to either (or setting up an indirectly 
attested third form from which both are 
derived). As such, all of his rules have the 
character of ‘lexical redundancy rules’ (in the 
sense of Jackendoff 1975) or ‘correspondences’ 
(in the sense of Lopez 1979). (Anderson 1985: 
52-53)
Anderson gives a number of illustrative 
examples of Saussure’s rule- based approach. 
Perhaps the most interesting is taken from the 
notes from one of his Greek and Latin phonology 
courses (see Reichler-Béguelin 1980). As a result 
of the historical change of rhotacism in Latin, 
that language displayed [s] – [r] alternations, 
as in honōs/honōrem. Working through the 
exposition in Saussure’s notes, Anderson 
concludes that the ‘alternation between [s] and 
[r] under determinate conditions… was, for 
Saussure, reflected as a rule of the grammar of 
Latin’ (Anderson 1985: 54).
Is it possible that Chomsky had read 
Anderson’s book, leading him to reevaluate 
Saussure’s overall approach? The answer is 
‘Almost surely, no’. For one thing, Knowledge of 
language had gone to press before the appearance 
of Phonology in the twentieth century. Secondly, 
Anderson informs me (p. c.) that he had not sent 
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Chomsky a pre-publication manuscript of the 
book, nor did they have any exchange of letters 
or emails with respect to the book, either before 
or after publication. And third, if Chomsky had 
nevertheless had access to the book, it would 
have been very unlike him to fail to cite one of 
his own former students on an issue of such 
magnitude. One must conclude, then, that 
Anderson’s reevaluation of Saussure played no 
role in any (putative) reevaluation of Saussure 
by Chomsky.
4. Understanding Chomsky’s 1986 quote
In my view, Chomsky on page 31 of Knowledge 
of language does not attribute to Saussure the 
view that langue was an I-language-based 
system of rules. The key word in the quotation is 
‘interpreted’. The overall context of the citation, 
as well as Chomsky’s prior rhetorical practice 
(see below, §5), indicate that what Chomsky 
really means is ‘reinterpreted’. In other words, 
he is saying (in effect), ‘Saussure’s grammar was 
a version of E-language. However, if we want to 
be charitable, we can think of it as a model of 
I-language and take off from there’.
The strongest piece of evidence for my 
interpretation (aside from the fact that it gets 
Chomsky off the hook for gross inconsistency) 
is that he overtly follows the same rhetorical 
strategy with respect to the philosopher Willard 
Quine in the same section. Quine, Chomsky 
asserts, is interested only in E-language:
Quine, for example, has argued that it is 
senseless to take one grammar rather than 
another to be ‘correct’ if they are extensionally 
equivalent, characterizing the same E-language, 
for him a set of expressions (Quine 1972). 
(Chomsky 1986: 20)
Now consider the last sentence of the 
Chomsky quote under analysis and the sentence 
that follows it:
The Saussurean concept of langue, although far 
too narrow in conception, might be interpreted 
as appropriate in this respect. The same is 
true of Quine’s definition of a language as 
a ‘complex of present dispositions to verbal 
behavior’ insofar as it focuses on some internal 
state rather than E-language, although it is 
unacceptable for other reasons. (Chomsky 
1986: 31)
Chomsky, who had just been charitable 
to Saussure, is offering the same gesture to 
Quine. He has not suddenly and dramatically 
changed his opinion of Quine’s theorizing. 
Rather Chomsky is saying that despite Quine’s 
own personal goals, there is no impediment to 
reinterpreting the end product of those goals in 
a way more congenial to his world view.
In any event, in an email message to Chomsky 
I presented to him the 1965: 4 quote and the 
1986: 31 quote back to back and asked him: 
‘Did you reevaluate your interpretation of 
Saussure between 1965 and 1986, or are people 
misunderstanding what you wrote later?’ He 
replied:
There’s no change in my views. The phrase 
‘might be interpreted’ refers to a possible 
sympathetic interpretation, in the specific 
context under discussion. (Noam Chomsky, 
personal communication 20 June 2012; 
emphasis in original)
It  is  an  interesting  question  why  Chomsky 
might  have  offered  a ‘possible sympathetic 
interpretation’ of Saussure’s langue in this 
context. I suspect that it derives from his specific 
goals in the opening chapters of Knowledge of 
language. In these chapters, Chomsky is not 
motivating a particular theory of grammar, but 
rather a particular approach to grammar, one 
which situates our grammatical competence in 
the mind of the individual. He had for over two 
decades argued for such approach, of course, 
but nowhere previously had contrasted (what he 
called in this book for the first time) I-language 
approaches from E-language approaches. 
Earlier, for the most part, he had simply accused 
the bulk of his twentieth century antecedents 
of proposing empirically incorrect grammatical 
theories, not with proposing epistemologically 
incorrect theories. But in chapter 2 of Knowledge 
of language Chomsky devotes several pages 
to arguing that Saussure, his structuralist 
successors, and the philosophers Lewis and 
278
ENTORNOS, Vol. 29, No. 2, Noviembre 2016
Quine had E-language-style grammars in mind, 
not I-language grammars. Since ‘the concept of 
E-language, however construed, appears to have 
no significance’ (1986: 31), he found himself in 
the awkward position of appearing to dismiss 
the studies of his predecessors as insignificant, 
if not utterly worthless. Clearly that has never 
been his attitude toward such individuals. Hence 
Chomsky’s noting (in the case of Saussure and 
Quine, at least) that their work could be evaluated 
much more favorably if one reinterprets them 
as sharing his I-language-based goals, however 
‘narrow’ and ‘unacceptable’ their reinterpreted 
theory might remain. 
5. Chomsky’s earlier rhetorical reinterpretations
Page 31 of Knowledge of language was not 
the first instance where we find Chomsky 
rhetorically attributing goals similar to his own 
to those whose work he was critiquing. In fact, it 
had long been his standard practice. For example, 
he begins his key chapter of Syntactic Structures, 
‘On the goals of linguistic theory’, with the claim 
that ‘a grammar of the language L is essentially 
a theory of L’ (Chomsky 1957: 49). He goes on to 
discuss requirements ‘that could be placed on the 
relation between a theory of linguistic structure 
and particular grammars’ (50). From strongest to 
weakest they comprise a ‘discovery procedure’ 
for the theory, a ‘decision  procedure’,  and  an 
‘evaluation  procedure’.  Chomsky  then writes:
As I interpret most of the more careful 
proposals for the development of linguistic 
theory [footnote omitted — FJN], they attempt to 
meet the strongest of these three requirements. 
That is, they attempt to state methods of analysis 
that an investigator might actually use, if he had 
the time, to construct a grammar of a language 
directly from the raw data. (Chomsky 1957: 52; 
emphasis added)
Here for the first time we find Chomsky being 
charitable to his adversaries9  by attributing to 
them the same conception —that of regarding 
a grammar of a language as a theory of that 
language— that he himself had. Very few 
linguists at the time would have described their 
aims in such a manner, a point driven home 
by the Voegelins, who remarked that ‘It [the 
argumentation employed by transformational-
generative grammarians — FJN] places models 
of their own making as constructs followed by 
their predecessors and thereby distorts history’ 
(Voegelin & Voegelin 1963:22)10.  Be that as it may, 
Chomsky’s rhetorical maneuver was successful 
in resetting the ground rules for debate over the 
adequacy of competing approaches to grammar.
Chomsky later adopted a similar rhetorical 
strategy with respect to the end product of 
earlier structuralist theorizing. In fact, much 
of Chomsky (1964b) in its various versions 
was devoted to looking at the syntactic and 
phonological  analyses  published  by  (mainly) 
post-Bloomfieldians and arguing that, as far as 
syntax was concerned, they could have been 
produced by a context-free phrase grammar 
(and were therefore inadequate) and, as far 
as phonology was concerned, they could have 
been produced monolevel rules of segmentation 
(and were therefore inadequate). Chomsky 
cautioned:
It should be noted, however, that modern 
generative grammars are typically not 
conceived as generative grammars, but as 
descriptive statements about a given corpus 
(text). Hence the taxonomic model, as 
described below, is no more than an attempt 
to formulate a generative grammar which is in 
the spirit of modern procedural and descriptive 
approaches. (Chomsky 1964b: 11)
9 Or uncharitable, depending on one’s point of view.
10 For a somewhat amusing consequence of the lack of shared theoretical goals between the early Chomsky 
and more established linguists, it is instructive to read the exchange between him and Archibald Hill after his 
presentation of the paper ‘A transformation- al approach to syntax’ (Chomsky 1962) (see especially pages 158-
160 of Hill 1962). Hymes & Fought (1981) has a useful overview of issues and debates surrounding the cited 
quote from Syntactic Structures, though I disagree with its interpretation on many points. 
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In other words, he is once again reinterpreting 
the work of his adversaries, so as better to 
demolish it. Chomsky’s strategy was adopted 
and greatly elaborated in two book-length 
studies by Paul Postal, Postal (1964) and Postal 
(1968), which dealt with syntax and phonology 
respectively. Even a sympathetic reviewer of the 
former book could note:
For him [i. e., Postal, and, by parity of 
argument, Chomsky as well— FJN] the charge 
that a grammar is a phrase-structure grammar 
and, therefore, considered as a generative device, 
demonstrably weaker than a transformational 
grammar, is the strongest criticism that can be 
made of it. For this reason he is prepared to 
ignore all the very great differences in ideas 
concerning the methods and aims of linguistics 
that separate him from these linguists, and to 
interpret their work as if it was intended to fulfill 
exactly the conditions that he himself would prescribe 
for linguistic research, in order, so to speak, to set 
them up for the final knock-out blow. The result 
is a view of the last thirty years of American 
linguistics which makes it look as if linguists in 
this period were groping towards the (in fact, 
entirely original) position adopted by Chomsky 
in Syntactic Structures. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that, viewed from this standpoint the 
most striking characteristics of their work should 
appear to be its imprecision, inconsistency, and 
an amazing tolerance of anomalies. (Thorne 
1965: 75; emphasis added) 
By the early 1970s Chomsky and his cothinkers 
found little reason to continue to train their 
guns on the Post-Bloomfieldians and other 
structuralist thinkers outside of the now well-
established generative tradition. The conflict 
had become an internal one: Chomsky’s main 
opposition was now composed of practitioners 
of the version of transformational generative 
grammar called ‘generative semantics’. In fact, for 
almost a decade the developers of this trend were 
numerically dominant within the world of formal 
theorizing (see Newmeyer 1986 for discussion). 
Chomsky’s first assault on this tendency took 
place during his 1968-1969 class lectures at MIT, 
which were published as Chomsky (1971). Here 
again Chomsky attributes to his opponents 
propositions that they do not themselves accept, 
so as better to demolish them. He writes:
Thus the deep structures, in this theory, 
are held to meet several conditions. First, they 
determine semantic representation. Second, 
they are mapped into well-formed surface 
structures by grammatical transformations 
(without any subsequent insertion of lexical 
items). Third, they satisfy the set of formal 
conditions defined by base rules;… I will refer 
to any elaboration of this theory of grammar as 
a ‘standard theory’, merely for convenience of 
discussion and with no intention of implying 
that it has some unique or conceptual or 
empirical status. Several such elaborations 
have been proposed and investigated in the 
past few years. (Chomsky 1971:185)
Chomsky goes on to argue that several 
proposals in the nascent genera- tive semantic 
approach (McCawley 1968a; 1968b; 1970; Lakoff 
1968; 1970b) are examples of such ‘elaborations’ 
of the standard theory, which, examined closely, 
turn out to be no more than ‘notational variants’ 
of analyses formulable in that theory and 
hence incorrect11. Yet manifestly, McCawley 
and Lakoff in those papers had rejected all 
three of the conditions comprising ‘a standard 
theory’12.  In other words, once again Chomsky 
was interpreting the work of others in ways 
that they would not accept (and did not accept 
— see Lakoff 1971) as a rhetorical strategy for 
combatting the proposals in this work. In the 
long run, I would say, this strategy was quite 
successful (see again Newmeyer 1986).
11 ‘Hence incorrect’ because later in that paper Chomsky elaborates a number of serious difficulties with the 
standard theory.
12 Other papers published by generative semanticists before 1971 were even clearer in their rejection 
of Chomsky’s three conditions: Lakoff (1969; 1970a); Postal (1970); Ross (1970). Some of these might have 
appeared in the journals after Chomsky’s 1971 paper went to the printers, but Chomsky was well aware of 
their contents, since they were presented at lectures at MIT and Harvard as early as 1968. 
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6. More on Chomsky (1986) and Beyond
As noted above, Joseph (2002) proposes 
an alternative explanation for Chomsky’s 
apparently considering Saussure’s views on 
I-language in 1986 to be highly congenial to his 
own. Joseph begins cautiously by noting that 
‘[w]e are still too close to the changes in question 
to be certain that we are judging them accurately 
and impartially’ (Joseph 2002: 153). But he does 
go on in the following pages to offer a tentative 
judgment on why Chomsky would have become 
more ‘Saussurean’ by 1986. Joseph points out 
that over the previous twenty years Chomsky 
had progressively de-emphasized  the  contrast 
between  deep  and  surface  structures  and had 
therefore turned back ‘in the direction of the 
sort of “flat” structure which once had made 
Saussure the possessor of an “impoverished and 
thoroughly inadequate conception of language” 
…’ (Joseph 2002: 153). Joseph then goes on to 
note that as syntax has become more ‘minimal’ 
in recent years, much of the work carried out 
by the rules of syntax in earlier models is now 
performed by features of the lexicon. The 
minimizing of the syntax in favor of the lexicon 
constitutes, as Joseph notes, a resuscitating of a 
key element of Saussure’s view of language.
What Joseph writes about the evolution of 
Chomsky’s ideas is essentially correct as an 
overall outline. In my opinion, however, it 
is inadequate as a proffered explanation for 
Chomsky’s wording on page 31 of Knowledge 
of language. In a nutshell, 1986 is too early for 
Chomsky to have been led to the conclusion 
that his views were (re)converging with those 
of Saussure’s. The amount of highly abstract 
syntactic machinery proposed in that book is 
about as un-Saussurean as any set of proposals 
for grammatical analysis could possibly be. Just 
to give a few examples, in Chomsky (1986) we 
find a distinction proposed between chains and 
CHAINS, where the latter include chains and 
expletive-argument pairs (p. 132), clitics moving 
in the level of logical form (p. 156), and an eleven- 
line licensing condition for binding (p. 171). It 
was really only in the mid 1990s that Chomsky 
began to extol the minimization of the work of 
the (narrowly defined) syntactic component. 
I am aware of only two works that refer to 
Saussure in Chomsky’s post-1986 writings. 
Both are positive and both seem to reflect the 
kind of convergence that Joseph (2002) had in 
mind. In the first, Chomsky notes that since the 
pared down genetically-determined initial state 
of the human language faculty ‘permits only 
a restricted variety of I-languages to develop’ 
(Chomsky 2000: 27), it follows that ‘variation 
of I-languages may reduce to Saussurean 
arbitrariness (an association of concepts with 
abstract representations of sound) and parts 
of the sound system, relatively accessible 
and, hence, “learnable” (to use a term with 
misleading connotations)’ (p. 27). Later in the 
book, Chomsky becomes even more explicitly 
Saussurean, remarking that ‘…language variation 
appears to reside in the lexicon. One aspect is 
“Saussurean arbitrariness,” the arbitrary links 
between concepts and sounds’ (p. 120).
One of Chomsky’s recent goals has been to 
attribute as much as possible to ‘third-factor 
explanations’, that is, those not specific to the 
faculty of language. The idea is that the more 
that can be attributed to external faculties, 
the more stripped down and minimalist the 
language faculty itself. The historically most 
prominent of such explanatory devices are 
the various economy principles, which have 
undergone development since around 1990. 
Surprisingly perhaps, Chomsky cites Saussure 
as the inspiration for such principles:
Much work in the structuralist tradition 
already suggested that the organization of 
linguistic inventories obeys certain economy 
principles (see Williams 1997 for a recent 
discussion in terms of the Blocking Principle of 
the Saussurean idea that ‘dans la langue il n’y 
a que des différences’ [in langue there are only 
differences]). (Chomsky 2002: 31)
The Blocking Principle (whose generative 
origins are in Aronoff 1976) prohibits certain 
lexical formations if another of equivalent 
meaning exists (glory blocks *gloriosity, for 
example) as well as a wide range of possible 
anaphoric dependencies. Interestingly, Williams 
appeals to Saussure’s notion of ‘value’ as the 
inspiration for the Blocking Principle, which 
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is one of the few instances that this notion has 
ever been cited by a generative grammarian, and 
certainly the only highly positive instance. 
7. Conclusion
Chomsky in his 1986 book Knowledge of 
language appears for the first time to attribute to 
Saussure the idea that langue is a system of inter- 
nalized rules. However, that was not Chomsky’s 
intention. The apparent attribution was nothing 
more than the use of a rhetorical device of a type 
that Chomsky had availed himself several times 
in prior publications.
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